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Note
Legislating Corporate Social Responsibility:
Expanding Social Disclosure Through the
Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule
Thea Reilkoff*
On July 21, 2010, in the wake of a global recession, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con1
sumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act to promote the financial
stability of the country. Dodd-Frank introduced the most
sweeping (and contentious) reforms in the financial regulatory
2
system since the Great Depression, ending “too big to fail” and
3
taxpayer bailouts. But the statute included “other purposes”
far removed from Wall Street reform, which have proved just as
4
contentious. One such provision includes increasing international transparency in the production of oil, natural gas, and
5
minerals. Section 1504 of the Act, also known as the Cardin6
Lugar Amendment, directed the Securities and Exchange
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. 2000,
Oregon Graduate Institute of Science & Technology; B.S. 1997, Mayville State
University. I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Green for her invaluable
insight and assistance with this Note. A special thanks also goes to Professor
Richard Painter for reviewing an earlier draft of this manuscript and providing insight on regulating social disclosure; to Jordan Weber, Emily Wessels,
and the staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their important contributions
and dedication; and to my husband, Ron, and three children, Avery, Alexandra, and Aksel, for their immeasurable patience and support over the last
three years. Copyright © 2014 by Thea Reilkoff.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
2. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by
the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the
-President-on-Regulatory-Reform (“[M]y administration is proposing a sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale
not seen since the reforms that followed the Great Depression.”).
3. 124 Stat. at 1376.
4. Id.
5. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2012).
6. Press Release, Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator for Md., Cardin, Lugar,
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Commission (SEC) to promulgate final rules requiring all companies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges and engaged in the
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, to disclose payments (i.e., taxes, royalties, fees, etc.) made to foreign
governments for the purpose of commercial resource develop7
ment. The law seeks to abate the “resource curse” that plagues
8
so many resource-rich countries. The mandated disclosure
rules are intended to shine light on the disparity that exists between the extraction revenues received by a government and
that government’s expenditures on societal needs (e.g., clean
water, food, heath, education), thereby empowering citizens
with the information needed to hold leaders accountable. The
rules are not the first of their kind, but are recognized as a necessary compliment to the existing volunteer-based Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) introduced by United
Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002 to promote
9
state adoption of an international transparency standard. And
they are consistent with a growing international trend to increase the transparency of labor standards and environmental
risk and, more generally, to promote corporate social responsi10
bility in all sectors of business.
Leahy Welcome SEC Approval of Transparency Rules (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin-lugar-leahy
-welcome-sec-approval-of-transparency-rules.
7. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q).
8. Press Release, Cardin, supra note 6; see also Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r,
SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Facilitating Transparency of Resource
Revenue Payments to Protect Investors (Aug. 22, 2012), available at https://
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490958#.Ux-BDIXFnXY
(“Transparency empowers citizens, investors, regulators, and other watchdogs
and is a necessary ingredient of good governance for countries and companies
alike.” (quoting 156 CONG. REC. S3816 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Lugar))).
9. See generally EITI, http://eiti.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). The
United States joined the EITI in 2011. Samuel Rubenfeld, US Joins Extractive
Industry Transparency Initiative amid Open Government Launch, WALL ST. J.
BLOGS (Sept. 20, 2011, 4:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/
2011/09/20/us-joins-extractive-industry-transparency-initiative-amid-open
-government-launch/. For information on the Open Government launch, see
http://www
Open
Government
Declaration,
OPEN GOV’T P’SHIP,
.opengovpartnership.org/about/open-government-declaration (last visited Apr.
22, 2014) (promoting transparency, citizen engagement, and access to enabling
technology).
10. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 2, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
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The SEC adopted the final rules in a 2-1 vote on August 22,
11
12
2012, against strong opposition from industry groups and
13
493 days past the deadline imposed by law. Less than one
month later, the European Parliament followed suit, calling for
the European Commission to establish rules that match, if not
14
exceed, the requirements imposed by the U.S. rule. Their
reach will extend to many of the same firms, given the transnational nature of the extractive industry.
On October 10, 2012, the American Petroleum Institute
(API) and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, along with two other organizations, filed a lawsuit against the SEC in the U.S. District
15
Court for the District of Columbia. The industry groups challenged the new rules under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Guiding Principles] (articulating a state’s responsibility to protect and businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights under existing international
law); U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited
Apr. 22, 2014) (providing a voluntary initiative for businesses and other
stakeholders to commit to promotion of universally accepted principles in the
areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption throughout
their supply chain); see also MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (Chip Pitts ed., 2009) (“[C]orporations are
seeking to redefine themselves as socially responsible. . . . [C]ompanies everywhere are lining up to sign on to codes of conduct covering environmental, social and economic performance.”); About the HRCA, HUM. RTS. COMPLIANCE
ASSESSMENT,
https://hrca2.humanrightsbusiness.org/Page-AboutTheHrca-1
.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (providing a comprehensive tool designed to
identify human rights risk in company operations).
11. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules Requiring Payment Disclosures by Resource Extraction Issuers (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171484028#.U0Yhe
1fBc0Y; Christopher M. Matthews, SEC Narrowly Approves Reporting Rules
on Resource Extraction, Conflict Minerals, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Aug. 22, 2012,
12:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/08/22/sec-narrowly
-approves-reporting-rules-for-energy-mining-firms/. Two members of the SEC
recused themselves from the vote. Matthews, supra.
12. Letter from Harry M. Ng, Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Corp. Sec’y,
API, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3–5 (Jan. 19, 2012), available at
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-121.pdf; see also GRANT D. ALDONAS,
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1504 OF THE WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT 21 (2011), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/
Policy/Congress/Analysis_Section_1504_paper.ashx (noting industry’s claim
that the proposed rules would require firms to violate existing contracts in
countries that prohibit certain disclosures).
13. See Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring the
SEC to issue final rules no later than 270 days after the date of enactment of
the Act or April 17, 2011).
14. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed.
Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
15. Complaint, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C.
2013) (No. 12-1668), 2012 WL 4803691.
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Constitution, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
17
Act), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming
that the SEC “grossly misinterpreted its statutory mandate,”
forcing companies to publicly disclose more than Congress required, and failing to properly assess the costs of compliance—
including the burden on competition—and the benefits to
18
shareholders and citizens of resource-rich countries. On July
2, 2013, the court vacated the rule and remanded to the SEC
19
for further proceedings. As of the time of this writing, the SEC
20
has yet to reissue the rule.
This Note discusses the importance of section 1504 in both
the national and international context as a model for future social disclosure rules across diverse industries and as part of the
growing international movement for transparency in the extraction industry, in particular. Part I explores the development of section 1504: its origins in the decade-long “Publish
What You Pay” campaign for transparency and the existing,
but inadequate, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
Part II carefully examines the congressional mandate and the
21
SEC’s exercise of discretion in rulemaking, the SEC’s costbenefit analysis, and the review standard adopted by the D.C.
Circuit in similar cases. Because the district court’s decision to
vacate and remand does not preclude the SEC from promulgating a substantially similar rule, this Note focuses on the argu22
ments which support the rule as written. Part II also analyzes
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp.
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
18. Complaint, supra note 15, at 2–7; see also Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (requiring the SEC to consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction
Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,397–403.
19. Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d 5.
20. Stella Dawson, SEC Omits Extractive Industry Rules from Its 2014
Priority List, THOMPSON REUTERS FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2013, 12:51 PM), http://
www.trust.org/item/20131209125125-6gr27/. In addition, the SEC omitted the
rule from its 2014 priority list. Id.
21. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (requiring the SEC to “); see also Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at
SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rules to Implement Section 1504 of the DoddFrank Act (“Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers”) (Aug. 22,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171
490864#.U1acJFfBc0Y (stating that such rulemaking is in conflict with the
SEC mission and prohibited by Congress).
22. The court did not consider industry’s First Amendment claim or many
of its APA claims. Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
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section 1504 in the context of the growing movement to legislate transparency for social needs. Part III discusses what
needs to be done to achieve the objectives of section 1504 and
what steps can be taken to expand transparency beyond the extraction industry.
This Note concludes that mandatory disclosure rules are
necessary to promote and protect human rights and that the
SEC acted in accordance with legislative intent and within its
statutory authority in promulgating a rule now consistent with
strong European Union (EU) rules and strengthened EITI reporting standards. While Congress may be required to further
clarify the SEC’s mandate under the Exchange Act, section
1504 should serve as a model for expanding social disclosure to
meet the growing demand for corporate transparency. Importantly, this Note recognizes that disclosure rules are insufficient on their own. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
must be tasked with using the information disclosed to advocate for effective change.
I. THE NEED FOR STRONG “PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY”
LAWS AND CONGRESS’S MANDATE TO THE SEC
The call for transparency is not new. It was nearly forty
years ago when the discovery of millions of dollars of questionable and illegal corporate payments and corrupt practices
pushed the SEC to “insure [sic] that investors and shareholders
receive material facts necessary to make informed investment
23
decisions.” One year later, Congress enacted the Foreign Cor24
rupt Practices Act of 1977, prohibiting bribery of foreign officials and requiring accounting transparency. The United States
led the charge internationally. In fact, it wasn’t until 1997—
twenty years later—that nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) joined in signing
25
an Anti-Bribery Convention. But the push for full transparen23. SEC, 94TH CONG., REP. TO THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING &
URBAN AFFAIRS ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES, at c (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC REP. TO CONG.], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegal-corp
orate-payments-practices-1976.pdf.
24. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 101–04, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494–98 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25. OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombat
Bribery_ENG.pdf. Recommendations were adopted in 2009 to further combat
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cy continued, particularly in the extraction industry where corruption has been prevalent. While the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have minimized
corrupt business practices, these laws fall far short of eliminating the corrupt practices of foreign governments. Companies
may be prohibited from making improper payments, or
26
“bribes,” to government officials, but nothing prevents a government from collecting similar payments in the form of licenses, permits, or other legal mechanisms—different means, same
illegitimate ends.
A. THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR TRANSPARENCY
27

In 1999, the human rights watchdog Global Witness
called on oil companies operating in Angola to develop policies
of full transparency, requesting that they publish all payments
made, including payments for what it describes as “dubious social projects,” and to clarify exact relationships with the gov28
ernment. It brought to light the industry’s contribution to the
plundering of state assets during a decades-long civil war and
its complicity in the government’s failure to address human de29
velopment needs. Despite its position as Africa’s second largest oil producer, the United Nations (UN) Human Development
Index—which measures development by combining indicators
of life expectancy, education, income—ranked Angola 160 out of
174 countries. Eighty-two percent of Angola’s population was
living in absolute poverty, fifty-nine percent without access to
drinking water, and thirteen percent afflicted with severe malbribery of foreign officials. Id. at 20. For more information about the OECD,
see About the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited Apr. 22,
2014).
26. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
27. Global Witness runs campaigns against natural resource-related conflict and corruption and related human rights and environmental violations.
Our Work, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/ (last visited Apr.
22, 2014). In 2003, Global Witness was co-nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize
for its work campaigning against conflict diamonds. Conflict Diamonds,
GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict
-diamonds (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
28. GLOBAL WITNESS, A CRUDE AWAKENING 1–3, 13 (1999), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/A%20Crude%20
Awakening.pdf. “Dubious projects” include upgrading houses and overseas
scholarships. Id. at 3, 13. Global Witness additionally highlights the need to
publish all payments in a format that is easy for the Angolan population to
understand. Id. at 13.
29. Id. at 21.
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30

nutrition. Yet it was estimated that the extraction industry
was contributing $1.8–$3 billion annually to the Angola state
income, and revenue was projected to grow substantially over
31
the next decade.
Angola was, and still is, an example of a country that is
plagued by what is commonly referred to as the “resource
curse”—the notion that countries rich in natural resources are
often fraught with mismanagement of revenues, corruption,
32
economic instability, and conflict. Global Witness’s 1999 exposé on Angola gained international attention from which the
Publish What You Pay Coalition was born—a campaign for the
disclosure of payments and expenditures in research-rich coun33
tries around the world. Since its inception in 2002 as a small,
primarily UK-based coalition, Publish What You Pay has
grown to include membership organizations in over sixty coun34
tries.
Acting on the Publish What You Pay campaign, UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair announced the launch of the EITI at the
35
2002 Sustainable Development Summit in Johannesburg. The
international political initiative encouraged governments of resource-rich countries, extractive companies, NGOs, and other
interested parties to develop a framework to promote disclosure
36
of payments and revenues. In its simplest form, the EITI requires reporting, verification, and reconciliation of payments
30. Id. at 1, 4.
31. Id. at 6; see also Angola: IMF Should Insist on Audit, HUMAN RTS.
WATCH (July 11, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/11/angola-imf
-should-insist-audit (calling for an explanation of how Angola spent more than
$41.8 billion in unaccounted for oil revenues from 2007 to 2011); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ANGOLA: AN UPDATE
11 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/angola04
10webwcover_1.pdf (“The 2010 [U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations] report underscored how oil revenue has fueled corruption and
mismanagement in Angola . . . .”).
32. See Paul Stevens, Resource Curse, ENCYCLOPEDIA EARTH (Aug. 22,
2008, 4:51 PM), http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/155721/.
33. History, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/
about/history (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). The scope of the Publish What You
Pay campaign has evolved to include transparency in government expenditures (“publish what you spend”) and licensing procedures (“publish what you
don’t pay/should pay”). Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. EITI, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND AGREED ACTIONS (2003), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/
pubs/files/eitidraftreportstatement.pdf.
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made by extraction companies and received by governments.
The EITI seeks to strengthen accountability and good governance, empowering citizens with information and stimulating
foreign investment by demonstrating commitment to transpar38
ency.
In 2013, thirty-seven countries were implementing EITI,
twenty-five of which were meeting all of the requirements of
the EITI standard, including Africa’s largest oil producer, Nige39
ria. Nigeria launched its initiative in 2004, becoming the first
40
African country to follow the EITI standard. In 2009, the government of Nigeria released its second audit, reporting an over
$800 million government shortfall in taxes, royalties, and sign41
ing bonuses that companies reported paying. Nigeria has long
been considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
Transparency International ranked it 37th most corrupt in
42
2012. But implementation of the EITI “cracked open” the extraction industry and exposed the intricate details of corrup43
tion. While disclosure alone will not create change, the information has allowed both international and state attention to
focus more effectively on ensuring that society benefits from resource wealth.
B. THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR TRANSPARENCY TAKES ROOT IN
THE UNITED STATES
By 2005, the Publish What You Pay campaign in the United States was working with members of Congress to strengthen
transparency initiatives, laying the foundation for what would
44
become the Cardin-Lugar Amendment in 2010. The disclosure
rules were first introduced in 2008 by Representative Barney
37. What Is the EITI?, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
38. Benefits from Implementing EITI, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti/benefits
(last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
39. EITI Countries, EITI, http://eiti.org/countries (last visited Apr. 22,
2014).
40. EITI, NIGERIA EITI: MAKING TRANSPARENCY COUNT, UNCOVERING
BILLIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter NIGERIA EITI], available at http://eiti.org/
files/Case%20Study%20-%20EITI%20in%20Nigeria.pdf.
41. Id. at 2. This amount exceeded the individual budgets for the Ministries of Education, Health, and Power. Id.
42. Corruption by Country / Territory: Nigeria, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA_DataResearch (last visited Apr.
22, 2014).
43. NIGERIA EITI, supra note 40, at 3.
44. Our Activities U.S., PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY U.S., http://www
.pwypusa.org/our-activities/us (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
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Frank and Senator Charles Schumer as the Extractive Indus45
tries Transparency Disclosure Act. While the Act was not
passed, it was reintroduced by Senator Schumer along with
Senators Ben Cardin and Richard Lugar as the Energy Securi46
ty Through Transparency Act of 2009. The sponsors claimed
that disclosure would lead to better governance which would, in
turn, result in strengthened U.S. energy security and national
47
security. When the Dodd-Frank Act opened for debate, Senators Cardin and Lugar introduced the Energy Security Through
Transparency Act as an amendment, which was adopted as sec48
tion 1504 and became law in July 2010. In 2011, President
Obama demonstrated further commitment to transparency by
announcing that the United States would also implement the
49
EITI, becoming only the second OECD nation to join.
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank added section 13(q) to the Exchange Act, directing the SEC to issue final rules requiring re50
source extraction companies to include in their annual report
any payment—including taxes, royalties, fees, bonuses, and
other “not de minimis” benefits commonly recognized in commercial resource development—made to a foreign government
51
by the issuer, subsidiary, or entity under their control. Additionally, the statute requires that companies disclose payments
according to type and total amount for each “project” and each
government and that they submit all information in an interactive data format, which includes electronic tags to mark speci52
fied information. Finally, the SEC, “[t]o the extent practicable, . . . [was to] make available online, to the public, a
compilation of the information required to be submitted under
53
the rules.” The SEC received and considered over 150 unique
54
comment letters and over 149,000 form letters. It extended
44.

45. H.R. 6066, S. 3389, 110th Cong. (2008); Our Activities U.S., supra note

46. S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009); Our Activities U.S., supra note 44.
47. S. 1700 § 2.
48. Our Activities U.S., supra note 44.
49. President Obama: The U.S. Will Implement the EITI, EITI (Sept. 20,
2011, 8:15 PM), http://eiti.org/news-events/president-obama-us-will-implement
-eiti. Norway was the first OECD nation to join the EITI. Id.
50. “[R]esource extraction issuer” refers to a company that “engages in the
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.” Dodd-Frank § 1504,
15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(D)(ii) (2012).
51. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(C).
52. Id. § 78m(q)(2).
53. Id. § 78m(q)(3).
54. Comments on Proposed Rule: Disclosure of Payments by Resource Ex-
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the comment period at the request of commentators and delayed issuing the final rule until 493 days after the deadline
55
imposed by statute.
In its 232-page final rule, issued on August 22, 2012, the
SEC dealt a surprising blow to industry groups opposed to the
rule. The SEC defined “not de minimis” as any payment or series of related payments that equals or exceeds $100,000, as
opposed to a $1 million threshold urged by some in industry or
56
a definition based on materiality as suggested by others. Despite strong pressure to define “project,” the SEC left the term
undefined, noting generally that the contract should serve as
57
the basis for definition and rejecting definitions proposed by
industry as inconsistent with Congress’s intent for transparen58
cy. The SEC refused to grant exemptions for commercially
sensitive information or for those operating in countries which
59
prohibit disclosure. And the SEC was not persuaded by commenters that Congress intended companies to submit payment
disclosures confidentially to the SEC and for the public to only
60
have access to the aggregate data. While the statute does not
define “compilation” as it relates to public availability of information, the SEC concluded that all payment disclosures re61
quired by the rule will be made available online.
The SEC estimated the total initial cost of compliance for
all companies at approximately $1 billion and ongoing costs be62
tween $200 million and $400 million annually. While Congress intended the rules to improve accountability and governance in resource-rich countries, the SEC noted that such social
traction Issuers, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210.shtml
(last visited Apr. 22, 2014). All form letters and the large majority of unique
letters were in support of the rules, requesting that the SEC follow the language of section 1504 and not give in to industry pressure for exemptions. Id.
55. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
56. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,381–83 & n.234 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 249). This threshold exceeded that urged by some commentators. Id. at
56,381–82.
57. Id. at 56,406.
58. Id. (rejecting industry pressure to define “project” at the country level,
as reporting unit, in relation to a particular geological basin or mineral district, or by reference to materiality standard consistent with federal securities
laws).
59. Id. at 56,368.
60. Id. at 56,391.
61. Id. at 56,390–94.
62. Id. at 56,398.
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benefits could not be readily quantified with any precision.
Additionally, the SEC made clear that such objectives would
not necessarily generate direct economic benefits to investors or
issuers, but may “materially and substantially improve invest64
ment decision making.”
C. INDUSTRY RESPONDS

On October 10, 2012, the API, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Independent Petroleum Association of America, and
the National Foreign Trade Council filed a lawsuit against the
65
SEC in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The industry groups alleged that section 1504 and the SEC rule
requiring disclosure violate the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by forcing U.S. companies to unnecessarily engage
in speech that discloses sensitive and confidential infor66
mation. Additionally, they alleged that the SEC violated the
APA and Exchange Act by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in
67
(1) declining to allow confidential reporting; (2) failing to de68
fine “project” as a geologic basin or province; (3) denying an
69
exemption in cases where foreign law prohibits disclosure; (4)
disregarding the Exchange Act which prohibits “impos[ing] . . .
70
burden[s] on competition not necessary or appropriate”; (5)
71
conducting insufficient evaluation of costs and benefits; and
(6) failing to solicit additional comments after releasing a
72
flawed cost-benefit analysis in the final rule. In sum, the industry groups argued that the SEC “grossly misinterpreted its
73
statutory mandate,” forcing companies to publicly disclose
more than Congress required, and acted outside its statutory
authority in issuing rules which imposed high costs—not only
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Letter from 58 Members of Congress to Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman, SEC (June 22, 2012), available at http://democrats.natural
resources.house.gov/sites/democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/files/
documents/2012-06-22_SEC_ChairmanSchapiro_ProtectPowerless.pdf (noting
that the rule “will also provide material information for investors to reduce
their risk and increase the choices of ethical investment”).
65. Complaint, supra note 15.
66. Id. at 28.
67. Id. at 30–31.
68. Id. at 31–32.
69. Id. at 32–33.
70. Id. at 34 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2) (2012)); see id. at 34–35.
71. Id. at 35–36.
72. Id. at 36–37.
73. Id. at 3.
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in reporting, but in business lost to competitors outside the
74
75
SEC’s reach —and with no quantified benefits.
Senators Cardin and Lugar refuted the industry groups’
76
claim of gross misinterpretation by the SEC. Following the
court filing, Senator Lugar stated, “[t]he benefits will not be realized if investments serve to entrench authoritarianism, cor77
Senator Cardin noted that
ruption and instability.”
“[i]ncreased transparency will not put companies that comply
at a competitive disadvantage but will reduce the risks for U.S.
investors” and referred to the rule as “carefully crafted,” “rea78
sonable,” and “very manageable.”
D. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES GAIN SUPPORT OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES
Just one month after the SEC announced the final rule, the
EU began garnering support for its own disclosure rule—one
that extends beyond the extraction industry to logging, bank79
ing, construction, and telecommunications. Before the court
74. State-owned issuers hold the majority of the world’s oil reserves and
produce the majority of the world’s supply. Branden Carl Berns, Note, Will Oil
and Gas Issuers Leave U.S. Equity Markets in Response to Section 1504 of the
Dodd-Frank Act? Can They Afford Not To?, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 758,
765.
75. Complaint, supra note 15; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (requiring the SEC to consider whether the rule “will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”).
76. Jim Snyder, Senators Contradict Oil Industry’s Challenge of SEC
Rules, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-10-11/senators-contradict-oil-industry-s-challenge-of-sec-rules
.html.
77. Id.
78. Press Release, Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator for Md., Cardin, Lugar Respond to Big Oil Challenge to Transparency Regulations (Oct. 11, 2012),
available
at
http://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin
-lugar-respond-to-big-oil-challenge-to-transparency-regulations.
79. Rep. of the European Parliament Comm. on Legal Affairs on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonization of Transparency Requirements
in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to
Trading on a Regulated Market and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, at 7,
Doc. A7-0292/2012 (Sept. 27, 2012) [hereinafter EU Disclosure Proposal],
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-0292+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN; James O. Green
et al., EU Parliamentary Committee Backs Tough Disclosure Rules for Extractive Companies, LEGAL INSIGHT (K&L Gates, Pittsburgh, Pa.), Oct. 3, 2012,
available at http://m.klgates.com/files/Publication/aa7765f1-7efa-494d-a7b1
-0065a2da6108/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bf155e6c-de25-4c56-9c48
-05b02346202f/EU_Committee_backs_Tough_Disclosure_Rules_for_
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rendered its decision, the EU Parliament voted in favor of new
EU Transparency and Accounting Directives which require resource extraction companies with securities traded on a regulated market to disclose payments to national governments on
a project-by-project level with no exemption for companies op80
erating in countries which bar disclosure. Combined, the U.S.
and EU disclosure rules will cover over ninety percent of the
extraction industry, while the EITI will continue to cover large
state-owned companies in the countries implementing the
81
EITI. In addition, efforts to increase transparency have begun
82
in Australia, Hong Kong, and Canada. At the G8 meeting in
June 2013, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced Canada’s commitment to mandate disclosure in the
83
extraction industry. Prior to that, the two largest Canadian
Extractive_Companies.pdf; Press Release, European Parliament Comm. on
Legal Affairs, Oil, Gas and Diamond Companies Could Be Forced to Fully Disclose Payments to Governments (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www
.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20120917IPR51496/html/
Extractive-companies-could-be-forced-to-fully-disclose-payments. The proposal
requires project-level reporting of all payments—including multiple related
payments—equal to or greater than €80,000 euros ($105,100), which is on par
with the U.S. rules. UK Back Tough Oil, Gas Anti-Corruption Law, REUTERS
(Oct. 11, 2012, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/britainindustry-mining-idUSL1E8LBC7P20121011.
80. See Minutes of the Sitting of 12 June 2013, 2013 O.J. (C 253 E) 142,
154, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
OJ:C:2013:253E:FULL&from=EN (voting on Transparency Requirements in
Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, P7_TA(2013)0262 (2013), available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/acp/dv/p7_ta-prov%
282013%290262_/p7_ta-prov%282013%290262_en.pdf).
81. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 75 Fed. Reg.
80,978, 80,980 n.39 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (originally to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 249) (stating that the rule applies to “90 percent of the major
internationally operating oil companies and 8 out of the 10 largest mining
companies in the world” and that twenty out of the top fifty oil and gas companies by proven reserves do not operate internationally and do not compete
with international companies); EITI, EITI RULES, 2011 EDITION 21 (Sam Bartlett & Kjerstin Andreasen eds., 2011) [hereinafter EITI RULES], available at
http://eiti.org/files/2011-11-01_2011_EITI_RULES.pdf (stating that the rule
applies to all companies—both public and private).
82. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed.
Reg. 56,365, 56,403 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249); Nick Cunningham, From the Lawyer: SEC Actions Dodd-Frank Disclosure Requirements for ‘Resource Extraction Issuers’, BREAKING ENERGY (Sept.
11, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://breakingenergy.com/2012/09/11/from-the-lawyers
-sec-actions-dodd-frank-disclosure-requirements/.
83. Harper Announces New Transparency Rules for Energy, Mining, CBC
NEWS (June 12, 2013, 7:33 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper
-announces-new-transparency-rules-for-energy-mining-1.1305236.

2448

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:2435

mining industry associations announced collaboration with
Publish What You Pay–Canada to create a new framework for
disclosure of payments to foreign governments by Canadian oil
and mining companies, which currently operate in over 100
84
countries. The Canadian mining industry is not alone in its
support for transparency rules. Norwegian oil and gas producer
Statoil openly rejected the lawsuit brought by the API, stating
85
that reporting is not an impediment to doing business.
E. DISCLOSURE RULES EXPAND BEYOND THE EXTRACTION
INDUSTRY
Mandating disclosure of extraction industry payments to
foreign governments is just one part of the growing movement
for legislating transparency and corporate social responsibility,
more generally. In addition to addressing the resource curse,
Congress, through Dodd-Frank section 1502, sought to crack
down on the use of “conflict minerals” used to finance violence
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other areas in central
86
Africa. Section 1502 required the SEC to promulgate rules
mandating that companies disclose whether their products contain defined materials, including tantalum, tin, gold, or tungsten, from the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining
country and what measures companies have taken to exercise
87
due diligence through their supply chain. In January 2012,
the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act took effect,
84. Andrew Bauer, RWI, Canadian Mining Industry Working to Improve
Transparency, REVENUE WATCH INST. (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:34), http://
www.revenuewatch.org/news/blog/rwi-canadian-mining-industry-working
-improve-transparency. For more details on the collaboration, see Memorandum of Understanding Between Mining Assoc. of Can.; Prospectors and Developers Assoc. of Can.; Publish What You Pay–Canada; The Revenue Watch
Inst.; (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/
files/Final%20Signed%20Canada%20MoU%20-%20July%2025%202012.pdf.
85. Press Release, Revenue Watch Inst., Statoil Withholds Support from
Lawsuit Against Transparency; Dutch Government Pledges Support for EU
Transparency, Resisting Pressure from Shell (Feb. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/press_releases/statoil-withholds-support
-lawsuit-against-transparency-dutch-government-pledges-.
86. Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Final Rules for Dodd-Frank Sections
1502 and 1504 (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2012/08/196882.htm.
87. Dodd-Frank § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012). This rule was also met
with a legal challenge. See Christopher M. Matthews, Business Groups Fully
Brief “Conflict Minerals” Legal Challenge, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Jan. 17, 2013,
4:28 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/01/17/business-groups
-fully-brief-conflict-minerals-legal-challenge/.
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requiring retailers and manufacturers doing business in California to disclose their efforts to eradicate human trafficking
88
and slavery from their supply chains. Additionally, the U.S.
State Department is currently considering strategies for implementing the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, in
effort to articulate the obligations of states and business enti89
ties under international law.
The Guiding Principles seem to be playing a particularly
important role in increasing corporate transparency. In addition to developing sector-specific guidance for implementation
90
of the Guiding Principles, in February 2014, the European
Commission announced that certain large companies would be
required to “disclose information on policies, risks and results
as regards environmental matters, social and employee-related
aspects, respect for human rights, [and] anti-corruption and
91
bribery issues.”
The United States has not yet taken this step, but there is
a clear trend toward increased government oversight and a
92
public demand for transparency. There may be disagreement
88. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, ch. 556, 2010
Cal. Stat. 2641 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (2014) and CAL. REV. &
TAX CODE § 19547.5 (2014)) (relating to human trafficking). In 2011, a bill
modeled after the California law was introduced in Congress, but effectively
died in committee. See Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act,
H.R. 2759, 112th Cong. (2011).
89. See Guiding Principles, supra note 10.
90. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, OIL AND GAS SECTOR GUIDE ON IMPLEMENTING THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(2013), http://www.ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainablebusiness/files/
csr-sme/csr-oag-hr-business_en.pdf.
91. Press Release, European Comm’n, Disclosure of Non-Financial Information by Certain Large Companies: European Parliament and Council Reach
Agreement on Commission Proposal to Improve Transparency (Feb. 26, 2014),
available at http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-29_
en.htm?locale=en. The directive will apply to “[l]arge public-interest entities
(mainly listed companies and financial institutions) with more than 500 employees.” Id.
92. The demand for public transparency may also be observed in the
growing trend toward sustainable and responsible investing (SRI). Since 1995,
the growth in total dollars under professional management outpaced the overall market, and the longest-running SRI index has performed competitively
with the S&P 500. Performance & SRI, F. FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT, http://www.ussif.org/performance (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
Organizations such as the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable
and projects such as Shift—which helps governments and businesses implement the Guiding Principles—also play a prominent role in driving the momentum for increased corporate social responsibility. See INT’L CORP. AC-
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over whether the SEC is the appropriate body to regulate social
93
disclosure in general, but regulating disclosure of financial information is well within the SEC’s purview and there is a
strong argument that the SEC has the statutory authority to
mandate disclosure for public interest, so long as it is not the
94
sole purpose of the disclosure.
Failure to move forward with disclosure mandates in the
extraction industry—the industry at the heart of corruption in
much of the developing world—would be an enormous step
back in the campaign for transparency. If we cannot demand
transparency from this industry, from whom can we demand it?
This landmark legislation marks a critical milestone for U.S.
corporate transparency. The law must be defended and its implementation must serve as a model for new regulatory
measures aimed at expanding social disclosure.
II. DEFENDING THE RULE: THE NEED, THE MANDATE,
SEC ACTION, WHY INDUSTRY CHALLENGES FALL
SHORT, AND HOW IT FITS WITHIN A BROADENING
INTERNATIONAL EFFORT
Congress intended the disclosure rule to address a social
problem and was fully aware of the EITI—its value as well as
its shortcomings—when it enacted section 1504. It clearly
sought a rule that would expand the scope of the EITI and, im95
portantly, mandate what the EITI has been unable to. MoreoCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE, http://www.accountabilityroundtable.org/ (last
visited Apr. 22, 2014); SHIFT, http://www.shiftproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 22,
2014). In addition to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95213, §§ 101–04, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494–98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is an example of increased
U.S. government oversight to address corrupt business practices. See Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.) (addressing major corporate accounting scandals including Enron and Global Crossing).
93. See Interview with Richard W. Painter, S. Walter Richey Professor of
Corporate Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. (Oct. 28, 2013) (noting that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of State, or others are likely in a better position to regulate disclosure for
purely social ends, including environmental pollution and labor issues, which
involve substantially more than disclosure of financial transactions).
94. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1235–46 (1999).
Williams notes that this is a “proxy” power “limited by the social goals underlying the [securities] acts.” Id. at 1271–72.
95. Compare Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77
Fed. Reg. 56,365, 56,368 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
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ver, it appeared to provide very little discretion to the SEC or
96
opportunity for the SEC to frustrate its intent. Nonetheless,
the court found there was room for interpretation and thus the
SEC must now reconsider whether or not its interpretation was
97
appropriate.
This section discusses the weaknesses of the EITI, the congressional mandate to the SEC, the SEC’s obligations under
the Exchange Act, judicial review under the APA, and the need
for a model for social disclosure expansion.
A. EITI FALLS SHORT
While industry has argued that the EITI meets congressional goals for transparency, the initiative has two critical
shortcomings. First, as a voluntary program, the EITI operates
98
only in countries that have accepted its requirements and are
99
meeting its standard. Second, the EITI’s flexible reporting
100
methodology results in inconsistent levels of disclosure. At
the low end, EITI disclosure falls severely short of the disclo-

240, 249) (requiring an annual report of disclosures within a year of implementation), with EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 19 (stating that countries have
eighteen months to publish an EITI report and two and a half years to submit
a final validation report which may or may not include disaggregated payments).
96. See Brief for Representatives Edward J. Markey et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 4, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1398), 2013 WL 179895, at *4 [hereinafter Brief Supporting Respondents] (“Here, the Commission was following such an explicit,
detailed congressional mandate; section 1504 laid out the precise contours that
the Resource Extraction Rule must have, and the Commission followed those
dictates to the letter.”).
97. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 13 (D.D.C. 2013)
(finding that the Commission erred in finding that Congress “has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” and that under Chevron’s second prong,
deference to the agency is “only appropriate when the agency has exercised its
own judgment”).
98. As of November 2013, thirty-seven countries were implementing EITI,
yet Shell operated in over eighty countries and Total operated in over 130. See
A Leading Global Energy Company, TOTAL, http://total.com/en/about
-total/thumbnail (last visited Apr. 22, 2014); EITI Countries, supra note 39;
Shell at a Glance, SHELL GLOBAL, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/at-a
-glance.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
99. How Countries Can Implement the EITI Standard, EITI, http://eiti
.org/eiti/implementation (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (outlining the process for
becoming an EITI candidate and reaching EITI compliant status).
100. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 12 (“The guidance is limited given that
the EITI is a robust, but flexible standard, and national stakeholders are to
adapt it to local needs and context.”).
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101

sure rules adopted by Congress. At its best, it serves to compliment the U.S. rule by minimizing the negative impact on
competition and providing a platform for extending transparency standards toward initiatives that effect the positive change
the EITI seeks—better governance and promotion of human
102
rights.
1. Voluntary Nature and Flexible Reporting Undermine the
EITI’s Objectives
Because it is voluntary, it is not surprising that countries
such as Angola, which are at the heart of the EITI movement,
103
have failed to join. Although membership is growing, there
are currently only forty-one member states, twenty-five of
which are meeting all requirements of the EITI standard, and
104
four of which have had their status suspended.
The EITI governing board—comprised of representatives
from government, industry, and civil society—sets the minimum standards for implementation, which are published in the
105
EITI Rules. Unlike the U.S. disclosure rules, EITI standards
are meant to provide flexibility to member countries—they establish a mechanism for transparency, but it is up to the mem101. Id. at 11 (noting that requirements are minimal and states are encouraged to expand).
102. The final challenge will be translating disclosure to a positive change
in the lives of the many untouched by the resource wealth of their country.
With new data made available through U.S. and EU disclosure rules, perhaps
the EITI can focus more on verification and expand its scope to include direct
impact on the conditions it seeks to change. See Jean Claude Katende, The
New Challenge for EITI: Becoming a Tool for Improving the Living Conditions
of Poor Populations, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www
.publishwhatyoupay.org/resources/new-challenge-eiti-becoming-tool-improving
-living-conditions-poor-populations (calling for a new mechanism of evaluation
that considers the changes, such as the impact on the lives of poor populations,
brought about by the implementation of the EITI).
103. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 22 (noting that the Angola
government has repeatedly rejected the EITI and there is no external pressure
to join); EITI Countries, supra note 39. The Human Rights Watch report also
notes that World Bank officials had informed Human Rights Watch that Angola already exceeded EITI’s requirements. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
31, at 22.
104. From Transparency to Accountability, WORLD BANK (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/12/19/from-transparency
-to-accountability. Countries that are not EITI compliant have not yet undergone the validation process, or have, but failed to meet the EITI criteria.
Countries have eighteen months to publish an EITI report and two and a half
years to submit a final validation report. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 19.
105. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 9.
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ber countries to implement that mechanism in a manner that
106
best meets their needs. These decisions are not made by state
governments, but by multi-stakeholder groups comprised of in107
dustry, government, and NGOs within each country. There
are some obligations that are non-negotiable. Under the EITI,
governments must publish “all material oil, gas and mining
payments to government” and “all material revenues received
108
by governments from oil, gas and mining companies.” The
EITI criteria leave it to member multi-stakeholder groups,
109
however, to determine the threshold for “materiality.” Additionally, the EITI criteria currently place no requirement on
110
how information is reported or published. While a growing
number of EITI reports include information that is disaggregated by company and/or revenue stream, some states continue
to publish composite data only, sometimes years after the pay111
ments have been made. Furthermore, unlike the SEC rule,
which requires project-level reporting, EITI still largely em112
ploys public reporting at the country-level, which is far less
valuable. Because projects vary significantly in scope, geologic
location, and risk, project-level reporting provides the transparency needed for citizens to hold their local or provincial governments accountable. This is particularly important in countries where revenues are distributed to the locales in which the
106. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
107. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 13, 15.
108. Id. at 21. According to the EITI Rules, certain revenue streams should
be included: the host government’s production entitlement, national stateowned company production entitlement, profits taxes, royalties, dividends, bonuses, license fees, and rental fees. Id.
109. Id. (stating that the multi-stakeholder group must agree on the definition and the reporting templates).
110. See id. (stating that the multi-stakeholder group is responsible for developing reporting templates to define which revenue streams are to be included and the time periods covered by the reporting); see also ANWAR RAVAT
& ANDRE UFER, TOWARD STRENGTHENED EITI REPORTING: SUMMARY REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4–7, 20–21 (2010) (noting EITI implementation issues include detailed reporting versus aggregate reporting and delay and difficulty in obtaining data to the degree that there is little value in producing
EITI reports).
111. Diarmid O’Sullivan, The EITI Needs to Become More Ambitious and
More Realistic, EITI (Sept. 27, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://eiti.org/blog/eiti-needs
-become-more-ambitious-and-more-realistic#.
112. But see Clare Short, Building on Achievement: A Proposal to Improve
the EITI, by Making the EITI Reports Better, Implementation Simpler, and the
EITI a Stronger Platform for Wider Reforms 7–8 (EITI, Board Paper No. 21-2A, 2012) (noting the emerging consensus that reporting standards should come
in line with U.S. rules of company-by-company reporting).
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operations are located. Additionally, project-level reporting
provides the level of detail investors need to evaluate risk,
which is critical in regions marred by instability.
While the SEC did not define “project,” it provided very
specific guidance on what the term could and could not in113
clude. Industry objected to this, arguing that the SEC’s gran114
ular notion of project is costly and unnecessary. But their objection is belied by the fact that some large companies
committed to corporate social responsibility already voluntarily
publish revenue for certain projects, including Newmont and
115
Statoil, two of the world’s leading extraction companies. Additionally, several countries have developed project-level reporting templates through the EITI with some success, includ116
ing Indonesia, Zambia, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Timor-Leste.
2. While Insufficient on Its Own, the EITI Adds Value to the
U.S. Disclosure Rule
One area of strength which the EITI has and the U.S. rule
does not, and cannot, is the ability to create a level playing
117
field. Although EITI rules vary by country, their application
is consistent within each country: they apply to all issuers
alike, whether publicly-traded or state-owned, and thus are less
likely to provide a competitive advantage or disadvantage. The
SEC did not disregard the potentially large impact compliance
will have on competition, but this was overshadowed by the
118
fundamental failure of the EITI to require implementation.
This is what sets the U.S. rule apart from the EITI and why the
113. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,385–86 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249).
114. Complaint, supra note 15, at 6.
115. REVENUE WATCH INST., PROJECT-BY-PROJECT REPORTING THROUGH
THE EITI 2 (2012), available at http://eiti.org/files/SWG/RWI_SWG_Paper_
Project_level_reporting_April_2012.pdf. Transparency International gave
Statoil its highest score in corporate transparency. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE REPORTING: ASSESSING THE WORLD’S LARGEST
COMPANIES 2 (2012), available at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/
docs/2012_transparencyincorporatereporting_en.
116. REVENUE WATCH INST., supra note 115.
117. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 23 (“The EITI Criteria require that all
companies—public (state-owned) and private, foreign and domestic—report
payments . . . .”).
118. Senators referred to the important strides the EITI has made in promoting transparency, but noted that “too many countries and too many companies remain outside this voluntary system.” 156 CONG. REC. S3815 (daily
ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cardin).
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U.S. rule is important to the EITI and its ability to meet its objectives. At the same time, the EITI may complement the U.S.
disclosure requirements by bringing companies outside the
purview of the SEC under the regulated scrutiny of the EITI.
Of course, some companies operating in non-EITI states
will remain out of reach. In addition to the U.S. disclosure rule
and proposed EU rules, support for transparency can be found
119
in Hong Kong, Australia, and Canada. But none of these initiatives will extend to the large state-owned companies in Russia and China. For this, expansion of the EITI may be necessary. Instead of opposing these initiatives, industry could use
its power within the EITI governing board and the state-level
multi-stakeholder groups to push uniform disclosure requirements. Companies and investors hold six spots on the EITI
120
board of directors—equal to other major stakeholders. Currently, these positions are held by Chevron, Statoil, Royal
Dutch Shell, Rio Tinto, Standard Life Investments, and Free121
port-McMoRan, Copper & Gold. All industry members, including alternates, fall under the purview of the SEC and new
U.S. disclosure rules. Industry has a voice at the negotiating
table. With U.S. rules in place, industry will have a strong interest in ensuring that everyone is playing by the same rules.
Industry could have the most powerful voice in driving that
122
charge. The question remains whether they will use it to obstruct or to create a uniform standard that can bring about
transparency and better governance throughout the resourcerich world.
B. CONGRESS MANDATES SPECIFIED ACTION
Congress fully recognized the purpose and the shortcomings of the EITI. The plain language of the statute and the legislative history show that Congress intended the SEC to promulgate resource extraction disclosure rules with the same
primary purpose—to empower citizens of resource-rich coun119. See Cunningham, supra note 82.
120. EITI, MEMBERS OF THE EITI INTERNATIONAL BOARD 2011–2013, at 2
(2012), available at http://eiti.org/files/22_10_2012_%20EITI%20Board%
202011-2013_0.pdf. Implementing countries hold five seats, supporting countries hold three, and civil society groups hold five. Id. at 1–2.
121. Id. at 2. Board alternates include ExxonMobil, BP, Pemex, International Council on Mining and Metals, De Beers, and Allianz GI Europe. Id.
122. But see Extracting Oil, Burying Data, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2012, at 73
(“Some suspect that the firms on the initiative’s board sing its praises only because they can ensure it stays toothless.”).
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tries to hold their governments accountable for the manage123
ment and appropriation of revenues generated. In his testimony on the Senate floor, Senator Cardin stated that this
amendment would “pierce the veil of secrecy that fosters so
124
much corruption and instability in resource-rich countries.”
Senator Lugar added that “[d]espite $1/2 trillion in revenues
since the 1960s, poverty has increased, corruption is rife, and
125
violence roils the oil-rich Niger Delta.”
But the call for transparency was not made solely with an
altruistic intent to support the impoverished communities
126
abroad, nor could it be under the Exchange Act. Both Senators recognized that the promotion of good governance would
have an additional positive impact on the United States—
improving the conditions in which the extraction industry
works and opening up new markets that are otherwise too
127
risky or unstable. Transparency, they said, would empower
investors with a better view of their holdings, improve the investment climate overall, increase the reliability of commodity
128
supplies, and promote energy security. These assertions were
supported by calling attention to the instability in the Niger
Delta that has already resulted in lost jobs and profits for
129
American companies operating in the region.
Congress knew what it was doing. Despite the district
court’s finding that Congress had not clearly spoken, the level
of detail and specificity with which the legislation was drafted
123. 156 CONG. REC. S3816 (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar) (“Adoption
of the Cardin-Lugar amendment would bring a major step in favor of increased transparency at home and abroad. . . . More importantly, it would help
empower citizens to hold their governments to account . . . .”).
124. Id. at S3815.
125. Id. at S3816.
126. See supra note 94.
127. See 156 CONG. REC. S3815–16.
128. See id.
Companies in the extractive sector face unique tax and reputational risks in the form of country-specific taxes and regulations. Exposure to these risks is heightened by the substantial capital employed in the extractive industries, and the often opaque and
unaccountable management of natural resource revenues by foreign
governments, which in turn creates unstable and high-cost operating
environments for multinational companies. The effects of these risks
are material to investors.
Id. at S3816 (noting the findings of the amendment).
129. Id. at S3815. Senator Cardin referenced a 2009 loss of production
reaching nearly one million barrels less than it was able to produce because of
instability in the region. Id.
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suggests an intent to leave little room for the SEC to render
disclosure ineffective.
The statute requires disclosure of any “payment” made by
a “resource extraction issuer” to a “foreign government” (or the
Federal Government) for “commercial development” of oil, natural gas, or minerals, including the type and total amount of
130
payments made for each “project” and to each government. In
defining many of these terms, Congress clearly articulated the
level of transparency it deemed necessary to meet its objectives
131
and granted very little flexibility to the SEC.
1. No Discretion for “Commercial Development” or “Resource
Extraction Issuer”
Congress defined “commercial development” to include
“exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other signifi132
cant actions . . . as determined by the [SEC].” While numerous commentators suggested defining “commercial development” in a manner consistent with the EITI which would
include upstream activities (exploration and extraction) only,
the SEC had only been granted discretionary authority to add
133
to the list, not remove activities Congress had enumerated.
Proponents of the expansive definition recognize the importance of disclosing payments made throughout the opera134
tion, particularly for transportation, given the long history of
human rights abuses and destabilization surrounding pipeline
135
transport of fuel.
130. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2012).
131. See Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 96, at 11–12 (characterizing Representative Waters’s opening statement in the House Financial Services Committee as speaking “only of the many things section 1504 ‘requires,’
providing additional evidence that Congress dictated the Resource Extraction
Rule’s ultimate scope”).
132. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(A).
133. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,373 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
134. See PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, THE EITI STRATEGY WORKING GROUP: A
SUMMARY OF PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY VIEWS 1 (2011), available at http://
www.publishwhatyoupay.org/sites/publishwhatyoupay.org/files/EITI%20Strat
egy%20Working%20Group%20-%20PWYP%20summary%20of%20views.pdf
(noting that the current scope of the EITI is too narrow).
135. In 2002, a Burmese villager brought a suit against Unocal for human
rights violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the ATCA claim was settled, EarthRights
International reported continued abuse in 2009. MATTHEW F. SMITH, NEW REPORTS LINK TOTAL AND CHEVRON TO FORCED LABOR AND KILLINGS IN BURMA,
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In addition to ensuring that all aspects of “commercial development” were within the disclosure mandate, Congress gave
no discretion to the SEC with respect to which companies the
mandate would apply. Congress defined “resource extraction
issuer” simply as an issuer that engages in the specified commercial development that is also required to file an annual re136
port with the SEC. Under this definition, no one is left out.
2. Limited Discretion for “Payment” and “Project”
Congress granted limited discretion to the SEC in defining
the level of reportable payment, and perhaps in defining “project.” While Congress defined payments to include taxes, royalties, fees, production entitlements, and bonuses, it also included “other material benefits” that the SEC determines are “part
of the commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial
137
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals,” not de minimis.
This gave the SEC discretion in adding to the list, which it did
not do, and defining the minimum reportable amount—that
138
which is not significant or “not de minimis.” It was important
to proponents of the rule that the SEC set a low minimum value to capture as much of the revenue stream as possible, rather
than ascribe a “materiality” factor or a value relevant to a com139
pany’s balance sheet.
DESPITE FLAWED IMPACT ASSESSMENTS (2009), available at http://www.earth
rights.org/sites/default/files/documents/press-release-total-impact-getting-it
-wrong.pdf; see also Marwaan Macan-Markar, BURMA: Pressure Mounts on
Energy Giant Chevron to Disclose Revenue, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 29,
2010,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/04/burma-pressure-mounts-on-energy
-giant-chevron-to-disclose-revenue/. Human rights violations surrounding the
Burmese pipeline were also noted in a comment to the SEC, stating that disclosure may enable communities to advocate that payments be used to compensate victims. See Letter from Human Rights Foundation of Monland to
Meredith Cross, Dir., Division of Corp. Fin., SEC 2 (July 15, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-99.pdf.
136. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(D).
137. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(C).
138. The Internal Revenue Service defines “de minimis fringe” as “so small
as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”
26 U.S.C. § 132(e)(1) (2012).
139. See Letter from Payal Sampat & Scott Cardiff, Int’l Program Coordinators, Earthworks, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-58.pdf (recommending
reporting of payments above $1000); Letter from Publish What You Pay U.S.
Coalition to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 4 n.8 (Dec. 19, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-116.pdf (“[A] reporting
standard based on materiality to the recipient government is qualitatively different from one based on the materiality of a project or a payment to the re-
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Although defining “not de minimis” was a clear point of
contention, industry’s argument focused more on the SEC’s
failure to define “project” when granted discretionary authority
to do so—or more accurately, to define “project” in a manner
140
agreeable to industry when granted the discretion to do so.
Project-level reporting may be the most important element in
the disclosure rule because it has the potential to bring trans141
parency to the community level. Congress left “project” undefined. In the end, the SEC also left “project” undefined, stating
that it believed the term was generally understood by industry
and that the contract should serve as the basis for its defini142
tion. Given the complexity of the multifaceted industry, covering exploration to export, this was probably a wise decision, if
not a necessary one. But it doesn’t mean that the SEC left “project” open to broad interpretation. The SEC unambiguously rejected recommendations by industry commentators, which included defining “project” at the country level, as a reporting
unit, in relation to a particular geological basin or mineral district, or by reference to the materiality standard consistent
143
with federal securities laws. By requiring disclosure at both
the “project” and “country” level, Congress clearly did not intend for the terms to be used interchangeably. And considering
that the primary purpose of disclosure is to empower citizens to
hold their governments accountable for mismanagement of revenues, Congress must have intended the term “project” to represent a more defined activity within a country, recognizing
that citizens will be best equipped to hold their governments
accountable when the partitioning is such that it allows specificity at the local or provincial level.
Industry’s opposition to project-level reporting is further
undermined by the EITI requirements for project-by-project reporting in some countries and by companies that voluntarily
144
publish such information. Even the Financial Times editorialized that there was “no justification” for watering down project-level reporting, noting that “most payments to states are
calculated on a project basis anyway, so publishing such detail
porting issuer . . . .”).
140. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
141. See Letter from Human Rights Foundation of Monland, supra note
135.
142. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,382 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
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145

is no great burden.” While industry claims that the rule is
over-burdensome, the real crux of their argument has nothing
to do with the amount of effort or expense involved in compiling
reports, but with the public nature of reporting that the SEC
has mandated.
3. Required Public Disclosure with No Express Exemptions
In an effort that would effectively eliminate all possible
hope for citizens of resource-rich nations, and particularly those
living under the most corrupt regimes, industry challenged the
SEC’s failure to exercise discretion with regard to public disclosure and failure to provide an exemption for operations in
146
countries with secrecy laws. In regard to public disclosure,
the statute states that “to the extent practicable,” the SEC
shall make available online a “compilation” of the information
147
submitted by industry. Industry argued that “compilation”
could refer to the aggregate data of all issuers on a per country
148
basis. But the SEC rejected this as inconsistent with the
plain language of the statute and the transparency goals artic149
ulated by Congress. The statute requires that companies in150
clude payment disclosures in their annual reports. Under the
151
existing Exchange Act, annual reports must be filed publicly,
and there is no indication that Congress wanted to make the
new disclosure reports, or any portion thereof, confidential.
While the industry groups challenging the rule argued that the
152
SEC “grossly misinterpreted its statutory mandate,” there is
no evidence that Congress had even considered the option of
confidential reporting. Instead, Congress focused on developing
a mechanism for compiling information into an easily searchable and reviewable format, evidenced by the requirement for
electronic tags to identify payments according to type, amount,
145. Editorial, Transparency Rules: Oil Companies Are Wrong to Resist
Publication of Payments, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/4ebf8410-5f16-11e1-9df6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nZRWgsKK.
146. Complaint, supra note 15, at 11–12 (alleging violation of the APA and
Exchange Act).
147. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(3)(A) (2012).
148. Complaint, supra note 15, at 16–17.
149. See Brief of Respondent SEC at 17–19, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC,
714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1398), 2013 WL 30051, at *17–19.
150. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,391 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
151. See Brief of Respondent SEC, supra note 149, at 18.
152. Complaint, supra note 15, at 3–4.
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currency, business sector, receiving government, and project.
While it is possible that some level of confidential reporting
could still further the purpose of empowering citizens, it is difficult to see how confidentiality and aggregated data could support investor interests in disclosure or improve the investment
climate. An investor can only assess the risks of a company’s
expenditures and practices, project cash flows, and acquisition
costs and management effectiveness if it has company-specific
154
information. Furthermore, the rule does not regulate in any
way the types or amount of payments companies can make to
foreign governments; it only requires that all payments are reported. Of course, as noted, all payments are subject to the
155
rules of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Unless Congress
intended section 1504 to serve simply as an additional tool for
identifying corporate corruption, which is not mentioned in the
legislative record, there is no logical reason that disaggregated
and company-specific data should be available to the SEC
alone. As expressly articulated, this information has the sole
purpose of benefiting citizens of resource-rich countries and investors, and thus full transparency must extend to those interested parties.
This is particularly important in countries that have secrecy laws or prohibit disclosure—countries often defined by their
autocratic regimes, ripe with corruption, bribery, and conflict.
The statute itself grants no exemptions, but industry challengers claimed that the SEC had discretion to provide exemptions
156
under the Exchange Act. At the same time, industry commentators failed to provide supporting evidence that the four
countries they identified—Angola, Cameroon, China, and Qatar—actually have some versions of laws which prohibit disclo157
sure. In fact, several commentators disputed this assertion,
noting that laws in these countries contain specific provisions
153. See Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(D)(ii) (2012).
154. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 56,397. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) cited the importance of comprehensive
disclosure in analyzing investment risk. See Letter from Jon Feigelson, Gen.
Counsel & Head of Corporate Governance, TIAA-CREF, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7
-42-10/s74210-54.pdf.
155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
156. See Complaint, supra note 15, at 5–6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78l(h)).
157. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 56,411.
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158

that permit disclosure to stock exchanges. The industry chal159
lengers have yet to produce evidence to the contrary. The
SEC was unconcerned by the potential impact on extraction issuers and correctly determined that such exemptions would
wholly undermine the purpose of the rule. To find otherwise
would necessarily mean that Congress enacted a law to achieve
social ends but with no mechanism for reaching those ends—a
law rendered ineffective from the outset.
4. Compelled Speech Is Within the Authority of Congress
The court did not address industry’s First Amendment
claim, and it will not be addressed in detail here. However, it is
likely to arise again, and if accepted, could have much broader
impact, “call[ing] into question thousands of reporting statutes
160
and regulations,” many of which mandate reporting of factual
information similar to that required under the resource extrac161
tion disclosure rule. Industry claims that the disclosure rule
represents “compelled, non-commercial speech” that would
162
place companies at a competitive disadvantage. This claim is
weakened by the current voluntary reporting of other companies such as Statoil, expansion of the EITI, and forthcoming EU
163
rules. But, it is important to understand the “competitive
disadvantage” industry is referring to. Industry groups argued,
“U.S. companies wish to avoid the speech because it is contro164
versial with certain foreign governments.” This is an anticorruption statute. Of course, disclosure might be controversial
with some governments. As Global Witness asks, “what are
165
[these] companies trying to hide?”
In tracking the well-defined language of the statute and
158. Id. at 56,370–71.
159. See Extracting Oil, Burying Data, supra note 122 (noting industry has
provided no examples of how local restrictions on publishing confidential contract details would upset U.S. transparency requirements).
160. Brief of Intervenor Oxfam America, Inc. at 2, Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1398), 2013 WL 179899, at *2.
161. See Brief of Respondent SEC, supra note 149, at 55–56.
162. Complaint, supra note 15, at 28.
163. Samuel Rubenfeld, Oil Industry Moves Forward with Extractive Industry Rule Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Dec. 4, 2012 5:37 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/12/04/oil-industry-moves-forward-with
-extractive-industry-rule-lawsuit/.
164. Complaint, supra note 15, at 29 (emphasis added).
165. Ben Geman, Oil, Business Groups Sue SEC over Disclosure Rule, THE
HILL (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:16 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/261377
-oil-business-groups-sue-sec-over-disclosure-rule.

2014]

EXPANDING SOCIAL DISCLOSURE

2463

legislative intent—to empower citizens of resource-rich countries to hold their governments accountable for failing to address societal needs—the SEC promulgated a rule which fully
complies with Congress’s mandate. The question is whether the
SEC had the authority to comply or if it necessarily should
have exercised discretion to act in accordance with its obligations under the Exchange Act.
C. INDUSTRY’S CHALLENGE TO THE SEC’S MANDATE UNDER THE
EXCHANGE ACT
The industry groups challenging the rule argued that the
SEC failed to exercise its discretionary authority under the Exchange Act and acted outside its statutory authority in issuing
166
rules which imposed high costs with no quantified benefits.
Under the Exchange Act section 3(f), the SEC is required “to
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest” and to “consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote effi167
Under section
ciency, competition, and capital formation.”
23(a)(2), the SEC is prohibited from adopting rules “which
would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appro168
priate in furtherance of [the Act].” Furthermore, if the SEC
determines that any burden is necessary or appropriate, it
shall include reasons for such determination in the rule’s
169
statement of basis and purpose. In its consideration, the SEC
recognized first and foremost that Congress intended the rule
to promote a type of social benefit that differs from the type of
investor-protection benefits SEC rules generally seek to
achieve. In this vein, the SEC determined that any potential
burden the rules impose on industry may be necessary to
achieve the purpose of the statute—increased transparency for
170
a social end. With this understanding, the SEC carefully considered the economic effects of the rules and, particularly, those
effects stemming from SEC action on provisions where it was
granted discretionary authority, to determine whether or not
the burden could be lessened without frustrating congressional
166. Complaint, supra note 15, at 2–7.
167. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012) (emphasis added).
168. Id. § 78w(a)(2) (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,398 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
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171

intent. In carefully reviewing all comments relating to projected costs of compliance, the SEC considered the rule’s effects
on competition and its ability to achieve its objective without
unduly burdening industry.
1. Cost of Necessary Burden on Competition
The SEC considered the qualitative impact of the rule in
addition to conducting a cost-benefit analysis. It determined
that disclosure, to the extent it informed investor decision mak172
ing, could improve information efficiency, but disclosure had
the potential to reduce allocative efficiency by diverting capital
away from other opportunities as shareholders bear the cost of
173
compliance. Alternatively, the SEC also proposed that disclosure might increase capital formation by increasing investment
by those who have been able to properly assess the “political
174
risk, acquisition costs, and management effectiveness.” While
informative, these considerations are largely speculative, absent quantification. Therefore, the bulk of the SEC’s consideration involved assessing the costs of compliance.
First, the SEC considered the compliance costs stemming
from the statutory mandate and the SEC’s exercise of discretion in limiting the definition of “project” and defining “not de
175
minimis” as payments over $100,000. Relying on estimates
submitted by one oil and gas company—ExxonMobil—and one
176
mining company—Barrick Gold —the SEC calculated the initial compliance costs using two different methods. In the first
method, the SEC calculated the average initial compliance
costs per company, identifying a lower bound of $88,000 (consistent with Barrick Gold estimates) and upper bound of

171. Id. at 56,397. While the SEC considered the costs stemming from the
congressional mandate, the SEC had not been granted the authority to exercise discretion in modifying the statutory language for the purpose of reducing
the economic impact of competition. Id.
172. Id. at 56,399.
173. Id. at 56,403.
174. Id. at 56,397; see also Extracting Oil, Burying Data, supra note 122
(noting one large investor’s belief that the rule would help him assess political
and regulatory risks and citing a poll showing investors managing $1.2 trillion
support the rule).
175. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 56,400.
176. Because Barrick Gold and ExxonMobil are both large extraction companies, the SEC found it appropriate to scale costs to the size of the issuer,
with compliance costs increasing with firm size. Id. at 56,408.
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$929,000 (consistent with ExxonMobil estimates). Multiplying that figure by the 1101 companies impacted by the rule, the
SEC estimated that the total initial compliance cost would fall
178
within the range of $97 million to $1.1 billion. In the second
method, the SEC conducted a similar analysis for small and
large firms, which represent unequal proportions of the mar179
ket. This formula dropped the maximum total compliance
cost for all firms by half—from $1.1 billion to $459 million—
although the SEC noted that the $1 billion estimate was consistent with estimates provided by commentators and consid180
ered it valid. The SEC used the same methods to calculate
181
ongoing compliance costs and concluded that the total ongoing cost of compliance would be between $200 million and $400
182
million annually. Although the SEC recognized several limi183
tations to its analysis, its estimates were based on the data
available to it and provided by commentators. Its estimates
were also consistent with commentator estimates.
Additionally, the SEC estimated losses for companies operating in countries which industry claimed prohibit payment
184
disclosure. The SEC assessed the costs of withdrawing from
one of these countries based on assets reported by those companies and losses a firm would incur if it could not redeploy
those assets in the host country or had to sell them at a steep
185
discount. The SEC identified fifty-one out of 1101 companies
186
that may be affected. While the SEC’s analysis was limited in
scope, it determined that commentators’ concerns were warranted—that withdrawing from countries that prohibit disclosure could add billions of dollars of costs and have a significant
177. Id. at 56,408–09.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 56,409–10. The SEC estimated that small firms represent sixtythree percent of issuers, while large firms represent thirty-seven percent. Id.
Small firms are those whose market capitalization is less than $75 million. Id.
180. Id. at 56,408–09.
181. Id. at 56,410. The SEC based analysis for ongoing compliance costs on
estimates submitted by Rio Tinto, National Mining Association, and Barrick
Gold. Id.
182. Id. at 56,411.
183. Id. at 56,410 n.620.
184. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting that industry had
failed to provide evidence that any country prohibited such disclosure).
185. Id. at 56,411.
186. Id. at 56,411 n.628. Only nineteen of the fifty-one companies operating
in those countries provided information specific enough for the SEC to use in
its analysis. Id.
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impact on a company’s profitability and competitive position.
Nevertheless, the SEC remained resolute in its conclusion that
providing an exemption would be inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute and would wholly frustrate congressional intent to promote international transparency where it is
188
most needed—countries wrought with corruption. Thus, the
SEC concluded that the burden was “necessary or appropriate
189
in furtherance of [the Act].”
2. Benefits Appropriate in the Public Interest Cannot Be
Quantified with Any Precision and Need Not Be
Congress adopted section 1504 with the explicit purpose of
providing the transparency necessary to empower citizens of
resource-rich countries to hold their governments accountable
190
for misappropriation of funds. Congress additionally noted
that promoting good governance could lead to political stability,
an improved investment climate, price stability, and energy se191
curity. None of the benefits Congress considered are the type
that would produce direct economic benefit to investors, but are
characteristic of benefits that “protect investors” in accord with
the SEC’s mission. In fact, the SEC noted that disclosure could
“materially and substantially improve investment decision
192
making.” It also noted that the benefits to victims of poor
governance could be significant given the per capita income of
193
resource-rich countries. Yet, the industry groups challenging
the rule claim that the SEC failed to determine whether the
194
They cite
rule was likely to achieve the desired benefits.
Commissioner Gallagher’s dissent in which he stated, “we have
no reason to think the SEC will succeed in achieving complex
187. Id. at 56,412.
188. Id. at 56,413.
189. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2)
(2012).
190. 156 CONG. REC. S3815 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Cardin).
191. Id. at S3815–16.
192. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 56,398.
193. Id. The Brookings Institute suggests that increased transparency, accountability, and governance could provide a three hundred percent development dividend to citizens of resource-rich countries. Daniel Kaufmann, SEC’s
Day of Reckoning on Transparency: Dodd-Frank Section 1504 on Disclosure of
Natural Resource Revenues, BROOKINGS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.brookings
.edu/research/opinions/2012/08/21-dodd-frank-kaufmann.
194. Complaint, supra note 15, at 5.
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social and foreign policy objectives as to which the policymaking entities that do have relevant expertise have, to date, large195
ly failed.”
But petitioners err in claiming that the SEC had to determine whether the rule would likely achieve the desired benefit.
The SEC need not determine the likelihood of success nor even
identify a mechanism for measuring success should benefits be
realized. The SEC need only consider benefits and, where it is
196
unable to quantify them, provide explanation. As the SEC
explained, the benefits “cannot be readily quantified with any
197
precision.” In support of the SEC’s action, members of the
House and Senate stated in their amicus brief that the provision of the Exchange Act petitioners cite applies only “where
198
Congress asks the [SEC] to consider the ‘public interest.’” Because section 1504 was a “congressional mandate,” they note
199
that the public interest would be served by its adoption.
C. THE RULE SHOULD WITHSTAND FURTHER COURT SCRUTINY
UNDER THE APPROPRIATE REVIEW STANDARD
Since 2005, the D.C. Circuit has invalidated SEC rulemaking efforts on three occasions on grounds that the SEC failed to
“consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”—the statutory review standard required under section
200
3(f) of the Exchange Act. In Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,
the court held that the SEC violated the APA in stating that it
would be difficult to determine the costs associated with elect-

195. Id. (quoting Gallagher, supra note 21).
196. See generally, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 4 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_
report.pdf (“Many rules have benefits or costs that cannot be quantified or
monetized in light of existing information . . . .”).
197. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,398 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
198. See Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 96, at 6.
199. Id.
200. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1812 (2012); see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d
166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133,
142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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201

ing independent directors. The court stated that uncertainty
did “not excuse the [SEC] from its statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it
202
has proposed.” In American Equity Investment Life Insurance
Co. v. SEC, the court assessed whether the SEC had appropriately considered whether its rule, disqualifying fixed indexed
annuities from falling within the definition of an annuity contract as defined by statute, would promote efficiency, competi203
tion, and capital formation. Here, the court found that the
SEC had failed to properly consider the impact on competition
by only finding that the rule would “bring about clarity in . . .
204
an uncertain area of law,” which would enhance competition.
The court held that there was no reasoned basis for this conclusion, and that the SEC necessarily should have considered the
205
existing level of price competition under state regulation. The
court’s most recent decision was in 2011 and pertained to a rule
206
In Business
the SEC adopted pursuant to Dodd-Frank.
Roundtable v. SEC, the court held once again that the SEC had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to consider the
rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and capital for207
mation. The court found that the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis
“had no basis beyond mere speculation” and that the SEC had
failed to quantify or even estimate the costs companies may in208
cur.”
In each of these decisions the court had assumed the authority to define what Congress has failed to—what it means to
“consider” efficiency, competition, and capital formation, a requirement added through the enactment of the National Secu209
rities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. James Cox and Ben201. 412 F.3d at 144; see also Investment Company Governance Act, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,387 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270). Chamber of Commerce challenged a rule that exempted otherwise prohibited transactions if a certain percentage of a mutual fund’s board were independent. 412
F.3d at 136.
202. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144. The court reasoned that the
SEC has a statutory obligation to inform the public and Congress of the economic costs of a rule before it is adopted. Id.
203. 613 F.3d at 167.
204. Id. at 177.
205. Id. at 177–78.
206. See generally Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed.
Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 246, 249).
207. 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
208. Id. at 1150.
209. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(b), Pub.
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jamin Baucom argue that the level of review invoked by the
D.C. Circuit in these decisions is “dramatically inconsistent
210
with the standard enacted by Congress.” Congress neither defined “consider” nor suggested that the SEC must abandon a
rule determined not to promote efficiency, competition, and
211
capital formation. According to Cox and Baucom, “[n]owhere
in the legislative history did any member of Congress ever specify, or even suggest, exactly how the SEC should go about ‘considering’ the enumerated factors, nor did any member ever
specify exactly what aspect of ‘efficiency,’ ‘competition,’ or ‘capi212
tal formation’ the SEC should consider.” Their review of the
legislative history supports the requirement that the SEC analyze the potential costs and benefits, including specific analysis
where practicable. But according to the Congressional Budget
Office, the 1996 provision was nothing new. It concluded that it
did not expect the provision to result in any additional cost because the SEC already conducted such analysis in rulemak213
ing. Furthermore, Cox and Baucom note that the provision
does not require the SEC to “determine” the rule’s effect on efficiency, competition, or capital formation, nor does it prevent
the SEC from adopting a rule because of uncertainty or nega214
tive impacts. This, they assert, provides further evidence that
Congress did not intend the provision to be particularly de215
manding on the SEC.
Under the plain language, the SEC considered whether its
rule adopted out of section 1504 would promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. It conducted a cost-benefit
analysis based on information provided by industry and concluded that costs of compliance may reach or potentially exceed
216
the highest costs companies claimed they would incur. It furL. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424–25 (adding § 3(f) to the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012)).
210. Cox & Baucom, supra note 200, at 1813.
211. Id. at 1819 (noting that language in a competing Senate version of the
bill, requiring the SEC’s chief economist to provide an assessment of likely effects of the rule on the U.S. economy and markets, received a “cool reception”
in that it placed undue burdens on the SEC and was unnecessary given the
notice and comment procedure).
212. Id. at 1821.
213. Id. at 1820.
214. Id. at 1821.
215. Id.
216. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,408–11 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249).
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ther concluded that, in certain circumstances, the rule would
necessarily place a burden on competition and would have a
217
negative impact on both efficiency and capital formation. Industry asserted that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously
218
in failing to use discretion to reduce the burden incurred.
The court’s authority for judicial review of agency action is
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
219
Inc. Under Chevron, the court must first ask whether the
220
agency had the authority to act and, second, whether the
agency permissibly exercised the authority Congress granted
221
it. Congress not only granted the SEC the authority to act,
but mandated action through section 1504 of Dodd-Frank. SEC
action may be distinguished from earlier cases in this regard.
While under Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, and
American Equity the SEC had the authority to act, Congress
had not mandated action. This arguably allows the court greater scrutiny in assessing the SEC’s interpretation of its authority.
Under the second step of Chevron, the court can invalidate
an agency-made rule only if it finds that the rule is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord222
ance with law.” The American Petroleum Institute court de223
termined that it need not consider this standard. According
to the court, the SEC had erroneously stopped at Chevron step
one when it took the position that it was bound by the plain
224
language of the statute. The rule was vacated and remanded
217. Id. at 56,399.
218. Complaint, supra note 15, at 2–7.
219. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
220. Id. at 843 (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.” (alteration in original) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974))).
221. Id. at 844 (“Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”).
222. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
223. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2013).
224. Id. at 13. The SEC argued that it had “properly determined [at Chevron step one] . . . that Section 13(q) requires the public disclosure of the issuers’ payment information.” Defendant Securities and Exchange Commission’s
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
at 39–40, Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (No. 12-1558 (JDB)), 2013
WL 2182599. The court responded that “the [SEC] ‘itself has stopped at step
one,’ believing ‘that it is without discretion to reach another result.’” Am. Pe-
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to the SEC for further consideration.
There is no reason that the SEC could not promulgate a
substantially similar rule, so long as it exercises the discretion
225
the court states it has. Congress expressly stated that the
disclosure mandate was necessary to promote good governance
abroad. This places the SEC in a good position to come out with
an equally strong rule. However, the SEC will be cautioned to
exercise greater restraint, to follow the intent of Congress
without unduly burdening industry, and to conduct rigorous
analysis. This will be no easy feat.
D. SECTION 1504 IS BUT ONE EFFORT IN A GROWING MOVEMENT
TO LEGISLATE TRANSPARENCY FOR SOCIAL BENEFIT
The SEC pointed to the widening global influence of the
EITI, proposed disclosure rules in the EU, and listing requirements adopted by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as further
support of a growing international effort to increase transpar226
ency in the extraction industry. Alone, the U.S. disclosure
rule pertains to ninety percent of the major international oil
companies, including Chinese companies, and eight out of ten
of the world’s largest mining companies—only two of which are
227
based in the United States. While there has been some speculation that companies will leave the U.S. stock exchanges to
228
avoid U.S. reporting requirements, this would be unlikely
229
under a new EITI reporting standard and similar EU disclotroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (quoting Arizona v. Thompson, 281 F.3d
248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). The court thus concluded, “[a]ccordingly, no deference to its interpretation is warranted.” Id.
225. See Samuel W. Cooper & S. Joy Dowdle, Federal Court Vacates the
SEC’s Section 1504 Reporting Requirements for Payments to Governments by
Oil, Gas, and Mining Companies, STAY CURRENT (Paul Hastings, Houston,
Tex.), July 2013, at 2, available at http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/
Upload/Publications/Federal_Court_Vacates_the_SEC%E2%80%99s_
Section_1504_Reporting_Requirements_for_Payments_to_Governments_
by_Oil,_Gas,_and_Mining_Companies.pdf (“Indeed, a subsequent rulemaking
process that takes account of Judge Bates’s concerns could still result in rules
substantially similar to those vacated.”).
226. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,365, 56,413 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
227. 156 CONG. REC. S3815 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Cardin); Jamie Drummond, Committing to Natural Resource Transparency in
Africa Pays, ONE (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.one.org/us/2012/09/14/commit
ting-to-natural-resource-transparency-in-africa-pays/.
228. See generally Berns, supra note 74.
229. See Short, supra note 112, at 8 (noting that it was recognized that the
“EITI could not require lower reporting standards than Dodd-Frank and the
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sure rules—a combined effect which will very nearly cover all
230
Furthermore, indecompanies in the extraction industry.
231
232
pendent initiatives of some companies and industry groups
to improve transparency may be indicative of a broader industry shift toward acceptance of expanded disclosure rules for social benefit.
Section 1504 was just one of several efforts by Congress to
increase corporate transparency for the primary benefit of citizens of foreign nations. As noted, both the conflict minerals
rule enacted as section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the
proposed Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery
233
Act seek to increase transparency for similar ends. Business
entities and, particularly, transnational corporations have long
been recognized for the power they have to significantly impact
human rights—both positively and negatively, directly and in234
directly. And the pressure on states to enforce laws aimed at
requiring business entities to respect human rights—not just
within their own territory, but with extraterritorial implica235
tions—is growing. After more than a decade of work to draft
EU regulations”); see also O’Sullivan, supra note 111 (“The EITI needs a way
of assessing these various innovations against global benchmarks or it will
struggle to say anything meaningful about them . . . .”).
230. See Oil & Mining Companies on Global Stock Exchanges, REVENUE
WATCH INST., http://data.revenuewatch.org/listings/ (last visited Apr. 22,
2014).
231. See REVENUE WATCH INST., supra note 115; supra text accompanying
note 115.
232. See Bauer, supra note 84; supra text accompanying note 115.
233. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
234. See generally Daniel Aguirre, Corporate Liability for Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights Revisited: The Failure of International Cooperation, 42
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 123 (noting corporate control over government policy, the
competing interests of states to protect human rights and attract investment,
and the need to hold transnational corporations accountable for human rights
violations); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003) (“Transnational corporations
evoke particular concern in relation to recent global trends because they are
active in some of the most dynamic sectors of national economies, such as extractive industries, telecommunications, information technology, electronic
consumer goods, footwear and apparel, transport, banking and finance, insurance, and securities trading.”).
235. See OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE:
THE ROLE OF STATES 1 (2012), available at http://accountabilityroundtable
.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Human-Rights-Due-Diligence-The-Role-of
-States.pdf (exploring the ways in which states use due diligence regulations
for business and generally finding that “governments have increasingly failed
to find a balance between the power of business and the duty of the State to
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international norms on business and human rights that could
garner broad support from business, government, and civil society, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the Guiding
236
Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011. The Guiding Principles implement the UN’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, whereby states have the responsibility to protect against human rights violations by business entities and
businesses have the responsibility to respect human rights in
237
their business activities. These principles have been endorsed
and implemented by several international organizations, including the OECD and the International Finance Corporation,
private and multi-stakeholder groups, and several UN Member
238
States, including the EU. They complement existing voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives, such as the UN
Global Compact, which boasts over 10,000 corporate partici239
pants, and the UN Principles for Responsible Investment Initiative, which supports investment principles that incorporate
240
environmental, social, and corporate governance issues. In
protect human rights.”); Larry Catá Backer, On the Evolution of the United
Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: The State, the Corporation and
Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 37,
42 (2011) (discussing the efforts to articulate a transnational regulatory
framework including state regulatory jurisdiction over corporations beyond
their borders); Human Rights Due Diligence, INT’L CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY
ROUNDTABLE,
http://accountabilityroundtable.org/initiatives/human-rights
-due-diligence/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (announcing the Human Rights Due
Diligence Initiative).
236. Backer, supra note 235, at 65–68; see also Guiding Principles, supra
note 10.
237. See Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Issue of Human Rights & Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., U.N. Human Rights Council, 20th Sess.,
June 18, 2012–July 6, 2012, ¶¶ 7–8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/29 (Apr. 10, 2012)
[hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Council]; U.N. Secretary-General, Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
¶¶ 18, 22–23, 28–29, U.N. Doc. A/67/285 (Aug. 10, 2012). Guiding Principles
will be embedded into U.N. human rights treaty bodies and other U.N. programs, policies, and activities. See id. ¶¶ 19, 21.
238. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 237, ¶¶ 24–32.
239. Overview of the UN Global Compact, UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2014).
240. Introducing Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT, http://www.unpri.org/introducing-responsible-investment/ (last
visited Apr. 22, 2014). The more than 1000 signatory firms are “estimated to
represent 20 percent of the total value of global capital markets.” U.S. SIF
FOUND., REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN
THE UNITED STATES 5 (2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/
Publications/12_Trends_Exec_Summary.pdf.
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fact, growth in sustainable and responsible investing has outpaced the market, rising from $639 billion in 1995 to $3.7 tril241
lion in 2012. According to the Financial Times, “[t]he case for
242
public reporting has long been clear.”
III. ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF SECTION 1504 AND
TRANSPARENCY BEYOND RESOURCE EXTRACTION
Through section 1504 and the SEC’s adoption of a final
rule, the United States has taken a leadership role in bringing
transparency to an industry that has fueled corruption, instability, and poor governance (over development and prosperity),
and has contributed to the growing needs of some of the world’s
most vulnerable populations. While there is no false hope that
U.S. disclosure rules alone will alter practices of revenue mismanagement or misappropriation, this information is a critical
piece of the solution.
Industry groups may have gained a victory in the court,
but there is no reason to believe that it will last. It is clearly
within the SEC’s authority to promulgate the same or a substantially similar rule upon further review. And it should. Of
course, it must be prepared to fight new challenges by some in
industry—it is important to note that API membership is seemingly divided on the issue. Some critics suggest that this challenge reveals a great deal about those crying foul. Their fear is
an inability to compete, yet not everyone shares this concern.
Surely there are multiple ways of competing. One involves efficiency and innovation in a level playing field; the other involves
deriving gains from “rent-seeking, monopolistic behavior, brib243
ery of foreign officials and tax avoidance or outright evasion.”
If this is the group that finds favor with the courts, we are
clearly on the wrong side of the global call for action.

241. U.S. SIF FOUND., supra note 240, at 11.
242. Transparency Rules, supra note 145. Michael Kerr, Richard Janda,
and Chip Pitts note a growing global trend to increase transparency in environmental and social performance and the important roles both regulatory
measures and volunteer initiatives have played in driving this trend. KERR ET
AL., supra note 10, at 241–84.
243. See Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, SEC Passes Natural
Resource Transparency and Conflict Minerals Rules: The Glass Is Fuller than
Expected, BROOKINGS (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2012/08/28-sec-transparency-kaufmann.
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A. ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF SECTION 1504: THE WORK IS
JUST BEGINNING
First and foremost, the SEC must promulgate a new rule
which closely mirrors the rule the court vacated. This will not
be easy, but it can be done. The primary challenges the SEC
faces are exercising discretion where it believed it had none
and preparing for a second round of judicial scrutiny. There is
significant pressure on the SEC not to weaken the rule—not
244
only by members of Congress, but by investor groups as well.
With the new EU Transparency Directive, investors are particularly concerned that “reporting obligations in [U.S. and EU]
245
jurisdictions are as uniform as possible.” Consistency in reporting requirements—including the definition of project, the
type of payments, and the minimum reportable payment—will
reduce the compliance burden for those multinational companies traded on multiple exchanges and regulated by multiple
bodies. Additionally, investors claim that the impact the disclosure will have on competiveness has been “significantly overstated,” and as such, there should be no exemptions for coun246
tries that prohibit disclosure. One group of investors stated,
“as investors, we stand to benefit more from efficient, competitive markets that enable ethical behaviour than we do from isolated instances of companies gaining a temporary negotiating
247
advantage through secrecy.”
Promulgating a rule capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny is only one hurdle. The SEC must also effectively implement the rule. The SEC received due criticism over its failures
248
in oversight that contributed to the global financial crisis. In
issuing a strong disclosure rule that matched Congress’s mandate, the SEC took a step in the right direction. But, in order
for the regulation to have effect, companies must disclose pay244. Letter from Sens. Benjamin L. Cardin et al. to Mary Jo White, Chair,
SEC (Aug. 2, 2013) (“The new rule should continue to make all reports public
and should not allow for host country exemptions. We believe the SEC has the
discretion and authority to retain both of these key aspects of the initial rule
as long as sufficient analysis and justification is provided in the rulemaking
process.”).
245. Letter from Steve Berexa et al. to Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC (Aug.
14, 2013); c.f., Letter from Jacob de Wit et al. to Mark Pearson, Dir. Gen., External Relations, Natural Res. Can. (Aug. 14, 2013) (pressing for similar rules
in Canada).
246. Letter from Jacob de Wit et al., supra note 245, at 2.
247. Id.
248. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1.
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ments, and it will be up to the SEC to ensure compliance.
Finally, in an effort to move governments toward increasing transparency in resource extraction and further develop
best practices for disclosure, the United States must remain a
leader in the EITI. The EITI represents an opportunity to continue to engage all stakeholders—government, industry, and
NGOs—in the discussion of transparency and ultimately good
governance practices. While industry has a large stake in this
action, it also has a powerful voice. To limit the rule’s impact on
competition, industry has an interest in using its position within the EITI governing board and multi-stakeholder groups, as
well as the EU and other markets, to push for a consistent international standard that levels the playing field and achieves
the objectives that all parties seek without unnecessarily burdening economic interests.
Finally, NGOs and civil society have perhaps the greatest
challenge. Transparency alone cannot bring better governance.
Civil society must advocate for justice and the appropriation of
revenues to provide social benefit for those in greatest need.
B. LEGISLATING TRANSPARENCY BEYOND RESOURCE
EXTRACTION
With growing international focus on corporate social re249
sponsibility, particularly in the EU, Congress may seek to
expand disclosure mandates to issues of human trafficking, labor standards, environmental risk, or other corrupt practices
which demand financial transparency. Legal challenge may not
be avoided; thus, it will be critical that Congress employ similar
thoroughness in articulating its objectives and attention to detail in drafting new rules, while recognizing the importance of
removing all hints of agency discretion where it intends to provide none. This is particularly difficult because it will require
that Congress take rulemaking authority out of the hands of
those with particular expertise in the area. It will be incumbent
on Congress to conduct more rigorous analysis of the potential
benefits and detriments of a rule up front.
Alternatively or additionally, it may be necessary for Congress to clarify the SEC’s obligation to “consider” whether action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
whether it will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation, as required under the Exchange Act. The type of so249. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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cial benefit sought may never be quantifiable, and compliance
may necessarily place companies that operate internationally
at a competitive disadvantage if rules are not universally accepted. Therefore, while “considering” a rule’s impact may generally be necessary to ensure that regulation does not unnecessarily hinder business activity and growth, striking a balance
between this and social objectives may not be possible for regulation that is almost purely motivated by a social agenda.
This was clearly the case in the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis.
Although the court should find the analysis sufficient, it was
largely an exercise in futility. For instance, the SEC had no intention of granting exemptions for companies operating in
countries where disclosure was prohibited, thus the effort of
calculating lost assets and revenue was an exercise in futility.
If Congress determines that these considerations are nonetheless important, it may be necessary to further articulate what
purpose they serve in the SEC’s evaluation and implementation
of a legislative mandate.
Finally, the SEC, after undergoing what is likely to be only
part one of judicial scrutiny, must be prepared to rigorously
analyze the statutory language and legislative intent and defend its analysis in each part of the rulemaking process. What
is required absent congressional action will become clearer as
the SEC is further tested.
As noted, disclosure mandates may not fall under the
SEC’s purview. For instance, the State Department, Department of Labor, or Environmental Protection Agency may be
better equipped to handle issues related to environmental
damage or the violation of human rights as a result of corporate
activity. The new SEC disclosure rules—particularly section
1504, but also the rule on conflict minerals—should serve as
useful models for expanding social disclosure laws.
Calls for transparency continue. For some issues, voluntary initiatives such as the UN Principles of Responsible Investment Initiative may achieve the objective, but for others,
mandatory reporting will be necessary. The right balance must
be struck, but Congress should continue to seek means to quell
corruption, promote better governance, and foster a strong investment environment.
CONCLUSION
The international movement for transparency in the extraction industry has been steadily growing over the last dec-
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ade. The EITI has made significant progress in recent years,
but has been limited to those countries that have been willing
to take steps toward accountability and better governance. The
United States is not alone in its push for transparency. The EU
has also adopted strong disclosure rules, as have other markets. Congress adopted rules it determined necessary to empower citizens in resource-rich countries to hold their leaders
accountable for misappropriation of extraction revenues, and
the SEC adopted Congress’s mandate. Following a successful
challenge by industry groups, in which the court held that the
SEC failed to exercise discretion because it erroneously believed it had none, the rule was vacated and remanded for further review. There is no reason that, with careful reconsideration, the SEC cannot promulgate an equally strong rule to
bring transparency to an industry ripe with corruption, and to
promote better governance, political stability, and market stability.
The rule should serve as a model for future social disclosure initiatives. However, to limit legal challenges, Congress
should clarify what the SEC must consider in its evaluation
and implementation of a legislative mandate that seeks social
benefit and exercise restraint in providing agency discretion.
Transparency alone is not sufficient to achieve positive social
ends, but it is necessary.

